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formulate a program of reform, I shall hope to prove that these criticisms have some underlying connection and positive import.

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DISCUSSION

JAMES, BERGSON AND MR. PITKIN

MR. PITKIN'S article in Vol. VII., No. 9, of this JOURNAL seems to exhibit Professor James in another of his imputed protean rôles. This time he appears, if Mr. Pitkin is right, as an untrustworthy reporter, a perverter of truth, who by his report has done Bergson a grave injustice, and himself perhaps a graver one. That there are differences between James and Bergson may be true, but it is hard to believe that James in his account of Bergson in "A Pluralistic Universe," blindly or willfully overlooked them, or that they were a matter of issue in that book. The question under discussion was not metaphysical, but epistemological, and Professor James's confidence in concepts was broken, not in so far as they were used as *controllers,* but as *revealers.* Their status in the flux was not in issue; their function as revealing it, was. And I submit, that if Bergson teaches anything, he teaches that concepts do not *reveal* reality, and can not.

Moreover, I doubt whether even metaphysically, there is the difference between James's and Bergson's view of the concept that Mr. Pitkin thinks there is. For both, essentially, the concept is *less* than the real, a secondary and derivative function of it, and not the real itself, taken in its integrity. Differences in the mode of formulating this vision of the concept's nature there no doubt are, but the vision is, to me at any rate, essentially the same. Therefore, until Mr. Pitkin announced it, I had no idea that Professor James was "against intellect." I was pleasantly certain that he was against *intellectualism,* but not against intellect—on the contrary, I had always supposed that Professor James had consistently done what Mr. Pitkin finds so excellent in Bergson—had "*taught that concepts were to be trusted in so far as we know what we are doing with them and in so far as we use them intelligently.*"[1] In fact, I had thought that pragmatism involved some such doctrine of the concept, and in another paper[2] I had suggested, with Professor James's approval, that it does so. My conviction in this regard is so obstinate that I can not help doubting, in spite of Mr. Pitkin's very clear and very damning quotations from both James and Bergson, whether he is really correct in his account. This doubt is further intensified by the fact that there has been ample time for Bergson to protest if he had believed himself misrepresented by James, yet no such protest, either public or private, has been forthcoming. Finally, Mr. Pitkin has brought me to consider that if "such an acute, sympathetic and well-seasoned reader as Professor James ever fancied he saw an exponent of his anti-intellectualism in Bergson," he is more likely to be right than Mr. Pitkin. But that is another matter. I am merely concerned here to show that whatever the differences or agreements between James and Bergson, James's report of Bergson is—Mr. Pitkin to the contrary notwithstanding—essentially correct. I can not help thinking, in a word, that Mr. Pitkin's reading of Bergson has caught at the inessential rather than the essential—a cinematographic instant, not the cumulative movement of Bergson's thought.

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[1] This JOURNAL, VII., 9, p. 230.

[2] This JOURNAL, VI., 24.

Mr. Pitkin's quotations come from the introduction to "L'Evolution Créatrice" and from the chapter De la Signification de la Vie, pp. 216, 221, 225—from those sections which discuss the natural function of intellect and indicate the utilitarian nature of knowing. The whole of this discussion and most of the chapter to which it belongs is still antecedent to that *critique of intellectualism* with which Professor James is concerned in his report, and Mr. Pitkin's quotations, and his use of them, made me feel that he had missed both the intent and the method of Bergson. The Bergsonian method is dramatic and cumulative; his intent is to demonstrate the externality of thought, its inadequacy for getting at the heart of reality. Beginning with an analysis of the evolution of life, he proceeds by showing that each of its mutations is purely utilitarian, and that each account of it misses its inner nature. Intellect, in the *natural, still uncriticized, history* of man, is such a utilitarian miracle of mutation, operating for the sake of keeping man going, but not for the sake of seeing reality as it is. Instrumental, unspeculative, it touches, when generalized, upon the absolute, matter which it has operated upon, which it has adapted to itself, until it has reached the limit of its proper capacity. Intrinsically, matter is pure, undivided "ecoulement" continuous flux, in reality identical with the other and polarized movement called life. But extrinsically, "le sectionnement de la matière en corps inorganisés est relatif à nos sens et à notre intelligence . . . la matière, envisagée comme un tout indivisée doit être un flux plutôt qu'une chose" (p. 203). Again, "intellectualité et matérialité se seraient constituées dan le détail par adaptation réciproque. L'une et l'autre dériveraient d'une forme d'existence plus vaste et plus haute" (p. 204). The effective determinant of material form is, moreover, as for Dr. Schiller, more human than material. "Nos perceptions nous donnent le dessin de notre action possible sur les choses bien plus que celui des choses mêmes" (p. 206).

These passages are all from the beginning of the chapter from which Mr. Pitkin has quoted so signally. They belong to an introductory sketch of the chapter's aim, which is finally defined, on pages 211–212, as the demonstration that "la philosophie ne peut pas, ne doit pas accepter la relation établie par le pur intellectualisme entre la théorie de la connaissance et la théorie de connu, entre la métaphysique et la science." This once agreed, it will be found that "l'effort que nous donnons pour dépasser le pur entendement nous introduit dans quelque chose de plus vaste, *où notre entendement se découpe* et dont il a dû se detacher" (p. 217). Please note the phrase I have italicized.

These few citations from the outline of the Bergsonian critical program indicate with sufficient clearness, I should think, how Professor James "can believe that Bergson thinks that concepts serve us practically more than theoretically," that "conception developing its subtle and more contradictory implications comes to an end of its usefulness" and that Bergson "*drops* conception." But in the interest of fairness let us take a full measure of quotation. Turn to the final portions of this chapter favored by Mr. Pitkin—*De la signification de la vie.* You find that the whole preceding analysis of knowing and intellect aims exactly at driving home the doctrine that utilities are not revelations, that conception must be dropped. Things do not exist, you are repeatedly told, only actions. "La *chose* résulte d'une solidification opérée par notre entendement—il n'y a jamais d'autre choses que celles que l'entendement a constituées. . . . Les choses se constituent par la coupe instantanée que l'entendement pratique, à un moment donnée . . ." (pp. 270, 271).

These hints become still more articulate and explicit when we pass from the description of the natural function of intellect to the critique of that substitution of the fixations of intellect for the character of reality which is called intellectualism. Then we find that in judgment concepts are things "plus ou moins artificiellement créés par l'esprit de l'homme, je veux dire extraits par sa libre initiative de la continuité de l'éxperience" (p. 315). Forms and concepts are invariably abstractions that miss the heart of reality. Even the concept of change itself is an inadequate substitute for "la spécificité du changement." What is here discussed, please note, is not concepts in operation, instruments helping us to get about in the world, concepts "used intelligently and in so far as we know what we are doing with them," but concepts as mere, practical cinematographic views of reality envisaged as its metaphysical essence, by Plato, by Aristotle, by science, etc. The outcome of the discussion is that Bergson "*drops* conception" just as Professor James says.

The reality is a thick, enduring, creative flux. Thought is a cinematographic mechanism and involves in its very essence two *fundamental illusions*. One consists in believing "qu'on pourra penser l'instable par l'intermédiaire du stable, le mouvant par l'immobile." The other consists in the practical habit that thought has developed of making use of the pseudo-idea of a void in trying to think the fullness of reality as such.[3] The concept, whatever its status *in* reality, is a "fundamental illusion" as a revealer, as a signification or representative of reality. Its sole business is to *control*. Immobile, it does, just as Professor James says, *altogether negate* the inwardness of the moving reality. It must be dropped, if that reality is to be apprehended. "Sur le flux même de la durée la science ne voulait ni ne pouvait avoir prise, attachée qu'elle était à la mèthode cinematographique. *On se serait dégagé de cette methode.*[4] Ou eût exigé de l'esprit qu'il renoncât à ses habitudes les plus chères. C'est à l'intérieur du devénir qu'on se serait transporté par un effort de sympathie. Ou ne se fût plus demandé où un mobile sera, quelle configuration un système prendra, par quel état un changement passera à n'importe quel moment: les moments du temps qui ne sont que des arrêts de notre attention, eussent été abolis: c'est l'écoulement du temps, c'est le flux même du réel qu'on eût essayé de suivre. Le premier genre de connaissance a l'avantage de nous faire prévoir l'avenir et de nous rendre, dans une certaine mesure, maîtres des événements; en revanche il ne retient de la realité mouvante que des immobilités éventuelles, c'est à dire des vues prises sur elle par notre esprit: *il symbolise le réel et le transpose en humain plutôt qu'il ne l'exprime.*[5] L'autre connaissance, si elle est possible, sera pratiquement inutile, elle n'étendra pas notre empire sur la nature, elle contrariera même certaines aspirations naturelles de l'intelligence; mais, si elle réussissait, c'est la réalité même qu'elle embrasserait dans une définitive étreinte " (pp. 370–371).

I have quoted at length. I could not do otherwise in fairness to Professor James. And anybody who reads this book of Bergson's through, or who is at all acquainted with his two earlier ones,[6] must realize that, if there are differences between Bergson and James, they are not missed by the latter. His primary concern in "A Pluralistic Universe" is not with them, but with Bergson's critique of intellectualism. Mr. Pitkin has not shown, and I feel sure, can not show that James anywhere claims an unjustified unanimity with Bergson. Mr. Pitkin simply misses the point of James's discussion and Bergson's intent. So far as reporting on Bergson goes, what has here been cited must indicate clearly that if anybody has failed to understand Bergson, it is not William James.

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[3] To get M. Bergson's full intention the whole passage, pp. 295 to the middle of 297, should be read.

[4] The italics are mine.

[5] The italics are mine.

[6] "Les données immediates de la conscience" and "Matiere et mémoire."

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REVIEWS AND ABSTRACTS OF LITERATURE

Imitation in Monkeys. M. E. HAGGERTY. Journal of Comparative Neurology and Psychology, Vol. XIX. (1909). Pp. 337–455.

Dr. Haggerty's problem was "to discover in what ways certain species of monkeys are influenced by one another's acts." As a matter of fact, his paper is mainly devoted to proving that the behavior of one animal *does* influence the behavior of another (observing) animal. The work is not carried far enough to allow us to make any analysis of the *ways in which* this influence is exerted.

The investigation was carried on in the Harvard Psychological Laboratory from October, 1907, to June, 1908, and in the New York Zoological Park from the latter date to September, 1908. The subjects used in the tests were eight cebus monkeys and three macacus monkeys.

The problem set the animal consisted in the manipulation of simple but well-chosen types of mechanisms. A large roomy experimental cage was built which permitted the easy installation of any desired mechanical device. In all seven types of mechanism were presented to the animals. Their type is sufficiently indicated by calling them, respectively, the *chute, rope, paper, screen, plug, button,* and *spring* mechanism. The successful manipulation of these devices always furnished the animal with food.

Each of the eleven animals was given five opportunities to learn to manipulate the mechanisms unaided. At the conclusion of these preliminary trials, it was found that each animal had either *solved* the problem unaided by the usual *trial* method or else had lost all interest in solving it. In every problem, then, the experimenter had at his disposal certain trained animals (called *imitatees*) and certain untrained animals called *imitators.* It remained then to test the effect upon the imitator of allowing the imitatee to solve the problem in the presence of the former. In some cases the imitator was allowed to enter the experimental cage with the imitatee; in others, the imitator was confined in an observation box which afforded a clear view of the acts of the imitatee. The imitator, after watching the acts of the imitatee, was immediately afterwards allowed to try the problem. He was permitted to work ten minutes (or longer if he seemed on the point of solving it). If at the expiration of this time